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Abstract
The current law on insider trading is arbitrary and unrationalized in its limited scope in a
number of respects. For example, if a thief breaks into your office, opens your files, learns
material, nonpublic information, and trades on that information, he has not breached a
fiduciary duty and is presumably exempt from insider trading liability. But drawing a line
that can convict only the fiduciary and not the thief seems morally incoherent. Nor is it
doctrinally necessary.
The basic methodology handed down by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Dirks and United
States v. O’Hagan dictates (i) that a violation of the insider trading prohibition requires
conduct that is ‘deceptive’ (the term used in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934), and (ii) that trading that amounts to an undisclosed breach of a fiduciary duty
is ‘deceptive.’ This formula illustrates, but does not exhaust, the types of duties whose
undisclosed breach might also be deemed deceptive and in violation of Rule 10b-5. Many
forms of theft or misappropriation of confidential business information could be deemed
sufficiently deceptive to violate Rule 10b-5. More generally (and more controversially), the
common law on finders of lost property might be used to justify a duty barring recipients
from trading on information that has been inadvertently released or released to them
without lawful authorization. Still, current law has stopped short of generally prohibiting
the computer hacker and other misappropriators who make no false representation.
This article surveys possible means by which to rationalize current law and submits
that the SEC can and should expand the boundaries of insider trading by promulgating
administrative rules paralleling and extending the rules it issued in 2000 (namely, Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2). Specific examples are suggested.
At the same time, this article acknowledges that the goal of reform should not be to achieve
parity of information and that there are costs in attempting to extend the boundaries of
insider trading to reach all instances of inadvertent release. Deception, it argues, should
be the key, both for doctrinal and policy reasons.
Keywords: Insider trading, deception, deceptive device, Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, agent,
fiduciary
JEL Classifications: A13, D63, D73, G18, H39, K42
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Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies
by John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Introduction
Inherently, the common law is path dependent. As a result, as the twig is bent, so
grows the tree. Once a legal doctrine has developed beyond its infancy, its future
trajectory is largely confined within boundaries established by the limited plasticity of
common law concepts. Gaps may be filled in; some critical terms may be marginally
reinterpreted; but radical change is unlikely. In this light, both because the law of insider
trading is largely judge made,1 and because it is well past its early formative period,2 it
seems particularly subject to these constraints.3

*

John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School
and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance. The author wishes to acknowledge the
helpful assistance of his colleagues Henry Monaghan and Jason Parsont, but alone is responsible
for any mistakes.
1
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (aptly describing Rule
10b-5 as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). However,
Rule 10b-5 has also grown through administrative rulemaking as well, and this article will
suggest that the most sensible way to fill in gaps in the law is through SEC rule-making. Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2 are the leading examples of such administrative gap filling, and they define
important fact patterns that today fall within Rule 10b-5 (but did not always). See 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b5-1 (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2013). Both rules were clearly intended to reverse
judicial decisions that had construed Rule 10b-5 narrowly. Compare United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (deeming relationship of husband and wife not to be a
fiduciary relationship), with Rule 10b5-2(b)(3), § 240.10b5-2(b)(3) (declaring spouses to owe a
“duty of trust or confidence” to each other the breach of which can violate Rule 10b-5).
2
More than fifty years have passed since the SEC’s decision in In the Matter of Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), in which then SEC Chair William Cary first provided a substantive
definition to the insider trading prohibition, formulating the “disclose or abstain” standard for
insiders.
3
In both Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165
(2008) and Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011),
the Court emphasized in decisions construing Rule 10b-5 (which is the source of authority for the
insider trading prohibition) that “[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action

1

That said, common law concepts are nonetheless malleable and have the potential
for expansion. In the case of insider trading law, duties can be derived from the common
law that would trigger an obligation to disclose or abstain from trading, but no article has
yet seriously explored these possibilities. This introduction will survey some of these
possibilities, but its goal is not to urge the maximum expansion of the insider trading
prohibition. Rather, it seeks to evaluate the tools at hand.
At the outset, it must also be recognized that the scope of the insider trading
prohibition has recently expanded, as the result of decisions that appear to relax older
doctrinal constraints. In net effect, these liberalizing decisions have shifted the balance
of advantage in securities enforcement litigation in favor of the Government. This
expansion in the law has largely occurred along two distinct axes: (1) additional duties
have been recognized whose breach violates Rule 10b-5;4 and (2) deception not involving
a breach of duty has also been found to violate Rule 10b-5.5
caution against its expansion.” In short, judge made law must be construed to give it “narrow
dimensions.” Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167. Still, if the Court’s concern is with the problems it
perceives with private causes of action, expanding the insider trading prohibition, itself, should
not heighten this concern, because insider trading is seldom enforced through private litigation,
but instead through criminal and SEC enforcement.
4
A leading example is SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), which accepted in
principle that a legal duty can arise by contract whose breach would violate Rule 10b-5.
Defendant had claimed that only fiduciary breaches recognized under state law could support a
violation of Rule 10b-5. Conservative law professors have long argued the thesis that only such a
state law-grounded violation could support a Rule 10b-5 violation. See Stephen A. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into The Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1267 n.320 (1995). But Rule 10b5-2 today recognizes that a “duty
of trust or confidence” can be grounded on a contract or an agreement “to maintain information in
confidence.” See Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), § 240.10b5-2(b)(1). Decisions to date have largely upheld
the rule. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that “a breach of an
agreement to maintain business confidences would also suffice” to support insider trading
liability); SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). However, in SEC v.
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 729–731, the Court drew a tortured distinction between agreeing to

2

The specifics of these decisions are carefully analyzed by Professor Donald
Langevoort and Stephen Crimmins in their excellent contributions to this symposium, but
this article will use this recent expansion as a jumping-off point to ask: How much more
doctrinal evolution is possible, without legislation, in the foreseeable future? More
specifically, how could the law evolve over the next decade? Is it possible that the law
could expand to the point that anyone who acquires and trades on material nonpublic
information would violate Rule 10b-5?
This article has both descriptive and normative intentions. Initially, it will first
map the gaps in existing insider trading law; then, it will consider how far the law could
be expanded, without legislation, through administrative rulemaking. Its model for
reform is the SEC’s successful effort in 2000 to extend the boundaries of Rule 10b-5
through the promulgation of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2.6 Motivating this inquiry is a
premise that needs to be explicitly stated at the outset: the current reach of the insider
trading prohibition is both arbitrary and incomplete. Egregious cases of informational

maintain confidentiality and agreeing not to trade. In its view, Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) improperly
“attempts to predicate misappropriation theory on a mere confidentiality agreement lacking a
non-use component.” Id. at 730–731. This distinction between agreeing to maintain
confidentiality and agreeing not to trade was, however, viewed skeptically by the Fifth Circuit,
which reversed and remanded. See SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). In United States
v. Whitman, No. 12-CR-125, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163138, at *14–*16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
2012), the district court went well beyond Cuban and held that Rule 10b-5 is not grounded on
state law theories of fiduciary duty, but rather on federal common law. To the extent that federal
law controls, SEC rules could do much more to generalize or expand the scope of the insider
trading prohibition.
5
See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussed infra at notes 7, 27–28, and 50–59
and accompanying text).
6
These rules were adopted in 2000 along with Regulation FD, which selectively bars selective
disclosure. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881, 73
S.E.C. Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
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misuse are not covered, while less culpable instances of abuse are criminalized. For the
long-term, the scope of the insider trading prohibition needs to be better rationalized.
To understand this contention, it is useful to begin our mapping of the current
outer boundaries on insider trading law with three recent decisions. First, in SEC v.
Dorozhko,7 the Second Circuit opened the door to the prosecution of persons who trade
on material nonpublic information, even when they do not breach a fiduciary (or similar
confidential) relationship, at least so long as they obtain the material nonpublic
information through “deception.” Immediately, questions arise as to how far this
minimal requirement of deception can be stretched. Could even overhearing an extended
conversation (say, in an elevator ride or in a bar) be deemed deceptive if the others have
incorrectly assumed that the defendant is part of their group and the defendant omits to
disclose the truth?
Second, in SEC v. Obus,8 the Second Circuit appears to have relaxed the former
requirement that tipper and tippee must be part of a de facto conspiracy in which the
tipper was deliberately providing the material information to benefit the tippee (either (1)
in return for an economic benefit conferred by the tippee on the tipper, or (2) as a gift by
7

Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42. In Dorozhko, the defendant appears to have hacked into a secure server
at Thomson Financial Inc. to gain access to the soon-to-be released, but still confidential, third
quarter earnings of IMS Health, Inc. (which had hired Thomson Financial “to provide investor
relations and web-hosting services” for it). Id. at 44. Learning that the third quarter results were
highly unfavorable for IMS, the defendant then purchased “put” options on IMS that would very
shortly expire, thus implying that the options would soon be worthless if IMS’s stock price did
not fall quickly. On these facts, the defendant had no connection to IMS or Thomson Financial
and clearly owed no fiduciary duty to either. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit panel found that to
the extent the defendant had “deceptively” gained access to material, nonpublic information, he
had violated Rule 10b-5. It remanded to the district court to determine whether the computer
hacking on its actual facts had “involved a fraudulent misrepresentation that was ‘deceptive’
within the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b).” Id. at 51.
8
SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
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the tipper to the tippee).9 Today, under Obus, it may be possible for the tippee to
“recklessly” violate Rule 10b-5, even without paying any benefit to the tipper, at least if
the tippee has “reason to know” that the tipper breached its duty in communicating the
information.10 Again, countless variations on this fact pattern can be proposed: for
example, suppose that one member of a live-in couple tells the other what he or she is
working on around the clock at the office and thereby divulges material nonpublic
information, because he or she is under stress and wants sympathy. At the bottom of this
slippery slope lies the simply negligent leakage of information: i.e., the loose-lipped law
firm associate in the crowded elevator who carelessly divulges the name of the target
company. The concept of deception cannot be reasonably stretched to reach all these
possible cases of unintentional tipping, but prosecutors and regulators are motivated to
strain to find deception because, under existing law, the liability of the tippee is
These are the standards specified in Dirks v. SEC, which said that “the test is whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain,
there has been no breach of duty to stockholders.” 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). The Court further
recognized that a fiduciary breach occurred “when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.” Id. at 664.
10
In Obus, the Second Circuit summarized the law on tippee liability under Rule 10b-5, as
follows:
“Tippee liability requires that (1) the tipper breached a duty by
tipping confidential information; (2) the tippee knew or had
reason to know that the tipper improperly obtained the
information (i.e., that the information was obtained through the
tipper’s breach); and (3) the tippee, while in knowing possession
of the material, nonpublic information, used the information by
trading or by tipping for his own benefit.”
693 F.3d at 289.
Nothing is said in this passage that requires that the tippee pay a benefit to the tipper, even though
the Court in the same paragraph required that such a benefit be paid to the tipper to establish
tipper liability. Seemingly, a distinction has been drawn here between tipper and tippee liability.
There may well be policy justifications for such a distinction, but the decision is silent on this
point and does not express them.
9

5

derivative of the liability of the tipper. Under Dirks, unless the tipper has breached some
duty, the tippee who profits cannot be held to account.11
Finally, several decisions have recognized that state law definitions of fiduciary
duty do no control or exhaust the field. Most notably, in SEC v. Cuban,12 the court
recognized that a duty to keep information confidential can arise either by contract or
based on other relationships that do not give rise to traditional fiduciary duties. In its
view, a breach of a contractual duty provides an even “stronger footing for imposing
liability for deceptive conduct than does the existence of a fiduciary or similar
relationship of confidence.”13
Once we move beyond state law-defined fiduciary duties as the exclusive source
of duties that can trigger a Rule 10b-5 violation, then the next question becomes: How
many other duties can similarly be postulated whose breach should violate Rule 10b-5?
This introduction will survey several potential such duties, in part because their discovery
could simplify insider trading enforcement and in part because their recognition would
make the insider trading prohibition more consistent and equitable. But the recognition
of these additional duties also exposes those who have legitimately gained informational

See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. (“Thus, the tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from
that of the insider’s duty”).
12
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 729–731 (N.D. Texas 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 620 F.3d
551 (5th Cir. 2010). Cuban was, of course, analyzing SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2
(2013), which defendant had challenged as beyond the scope of the SEC’s authority. For an
equally important, if less noticed, decision, see United States v. Whitman, No. 12-CR-125, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163138, at *14–*16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (finding federal law to control
the issue of who qualifies as a fiduciary for purposes of insider trading liability). See also infra
note 64.
13
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (explaining that a contract can capture the defendant’s
“obligation with greater acuity than does a duty that flows more generally from the nature of the
parties’ relationship.”)..
11
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advantages to potential prosecution and may create a trap for the unwary with very
uncertain boundaries. Balancing the costs and benefits of any extension is therefore
essential. Accordingly, the aim of this overview is more to map the possibilities than to
argue for any definitive position. Part I will begin by seeking to identify where the major
gaps exist in contemporary law. Part II will then turn to conceivable doctrinal answers
that could be used to plug these gaps and will consider possible SEC rules to implement
such duties. Finally, Part III will conclude with an evaluation of these possibilities.
Part I: Gaps in the Law
Twenty years ago, in Dirks v. SEC,14 the Supreme Court grafted a “breach of
duty” precondition onto insider trading law. Essentially, the Court ruled that it was the
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty that made the use of an informational advantage
deceptive and thus within the scope of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition. Doctrinally, this step
was necessary because Rule 10b-5 necessarily rests on Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, which grants authority to the SEC to adopt rules proscribing the use of
“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”15 Deception thus becomes an
indispensable element.16 Although Dirks clearly establishes that the failure to disclose a
breach of fiduciary duty before trading is deceptive, it does not hold that this one example

14

463 U.S. at 647–648.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012).
16
In principle, the Government could alternatively seek to prove a Rule 10b-5 violation by
showing that conduct was “manipulative.” But “manipulation” and “manipulative” are terms of
art that the Supreme Court has long narrowly construed to exclusively cover practices “intended
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.” Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 476 (1977). Hence, neither “contrivance” nor “manipulative” in Section 10(b) add much, if
anything, to its coverage.
15
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of deception exhausts the field. Other forms of deception that do not involve a fiduciary
breach remain possible.
In all likelihood, Dirks was a product both of its time and a post-Watergate
zeitgeist. The defendant analyst (Ray Dirks), who received material information from an
insider at Equity Funding, seemed more a hero than a villain to most observers, but not to
the tone deaf SEC (which may have been embarrassed by the fact that Ray Dirks, and not
it, had uncovered the epic fraud at Equity Funding). The Court in Dirks elaborately
strove to find ways to protect the securities analyst from potential prosecution any time it
passed on information to institutional clients. Motivating this desire was probably the
sense that only with such insulation could securities analysts uncover and expose
dangerous frauds, which seemed to elude bureaucratic, slower-moving regulators.17
The Dirks decision also resonated with the dominant post-Watergate sensibility of
its era. The defendant securities analyst had played a socially desirable role that was
functionally equivalent to the role of the Washington Post journalists (Woodward and
Bernstein) who had uncovered Watergate years earlier. Because the SEC’s broad theory
of liability would have chilled analysts’ incentive to investigate, the Court seemed
motivated to resist the SEC’s theory. Today, securities analysts less often resemble
heroes and often look more like highly conflicted gatekeepers, particularly after the burst
of the IPO Bubble in 2000 and the resulting Global Settlement in 2003. That settlement,
engineered by then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer with the major investment
banks, reflected a consensus that securities analysts were involved in marketing activities
Dirks tends to glorify the role of the securities analyst, defining that role as “to ‘ferret out and
analyze information’” and describing such a role as “necessary to the preservation of a healthy
market.” 463 U.S. at 658.
17
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for their investment bank employers that left them highly conflicted.18 If Dirks had
instead been decided today, analysts might have received a considerably less deferential
treatment from the Court.
Because law is path dependant, Dirks will continue to shape the development of
contemporary law. But, after Dorozhko, alternative forms of deception may be accepted
as a substitute for the fiduciary breach that Dirks placed at stage center. How far can
these substitute theories be stretched? To answer, it is useful to survey the most obvious
categories of misconduct that seem today to fall outside the scope of the existing insider
trading prohibition, as defined by Dirks and O’Hagan. These include:
A. Careless Tipper/Corrupt Tippee
In SEC v. Yun,19 a senior corporate officer and his wife were in the process of
divorce. She called her divorce attorney from her office at a real estate brokerage firm to
pass on facts that she had just learned from her husband, indicating that stock and options
he owned in his employer were about to decline in value. The purpose of the call was to
adjust the valuation of his assets for the purpose of the divorce settlement. The negative
news that she disclosed was overheard by another real estate broker in the office, who
quickly sold the company’s stock short and profited. The SEC sued the non-trading wife,
as well as her co-worker, probably because it realized it needed to show a breach by the
tipper to hold the tippee liable. Thus, the SEC alleged that the wife had “recklessly”
18

For a brief description of this settlement, which also involved the NASD, the NYSE and most
state securities commissioners, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. AND HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (12th ed. 2012) at 111–112. Several FINRA rules were
also adopted to curb analyst conflicts by precluding analysts from participating in certain
marketing activities, but some of these rules have been subsequently preempted by the JOBS Act.
Id. at 112.
19
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, (11th Cir. 2003).

9

tipped her co-worker. In all likelihood, the SEC believed that the wife had tipped her
colleague knowingly and deliberately as part of a longstanding pattern of sharing real
estate commissions, but it was uncertain that it had sufficient evidence to prove this
contention. Although the district court accepted the SEC’s theory of “reckless” tipping,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the “recklessness” charge unfairly prejudiced
the defendant and that such conduct by the tipper, when unmotivated by any expected
benefit from the tippee, was beyond the scope of Rule 10b-5.
Although the SEC lost Round One in Yun, it may have scored a comeback victory
more recently in Obus.20 There, an employee of GE Capital, which was considering
financing an acquisition of a target company, called a college friend who worked at a
hedge fund that owned a large stake in that target company. Apparently as the result of
this conversation, the hedge fund increased its stake in the target. The defendant GE
employee attempted to justify this contact as a means of gaining information about the
target for his employer. No evidence suggested that the defendant GE employee
expected or received any personal benefit from tipping his college friend (although it is
arguable that their college friendship might have inclined the GE employee to make a gift
to his friend).
Sidestepping these factual issues, the Second Circuit found that the defendant GE
employee could be liable as a tipper if he acted “recklessly” in communicating the
information to his college friend in violation of GE’s policies. The Second Circuit panel
gave a “hypothetical” example of a person on a train who knowingly discusses material,

20

693 F.3d 276.

10

nonpublic information in the presence of a friend who he expects will trade on it.21
Although it seems doubtful that the facts in Obus would suffice to show a “willful”
violation (as is required in the Second Circuit in the case of a criminal prosecution22), the
bottom line seems to be that the SEC, at least in the Second Circuit, can go forward by
alleging that a friend “recklessly” enabled another friend to trade. Although the cases are
thus divided, the “gift” or economic benefit requirement in Dirks seems to have become
attenuated.23
At least for the present, Obus seems limited to the context of communications
among friends. It would seemingly not apply to the garrulous associate who discusses
material nonpublic information in the elevator (unless possibly if the elevator was filled
with his friends). Closer cases can, however, be imagined. For example, how should the
law treat the more opportunistic conduct of the bartender in a Wall Street club who
carefully listens to the conversation of two increasingly tipsy investment bankers? No
intention to make a gift is apparent here, nor is there any clear breach of fiduciary duty,
as presumably the club lacks policies regarding information that its employees learn from
customers. Finally, it is unlikely that the relationship between the bartender and his
customers would rise to the level that it could be said that the parties had “a history,
21

Id. at 287.
Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act criminalizes “willful” violations of the rules or
regulations adopted under that Act (including Rule 10b-5). See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West
2012). Courts in the Second Circuit have interpreted this language to require “specific intent to
defraud.” See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Whitman, No. 12-CR-125, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163138, at *23–*28. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
2012).
23
Most of us have college friends that we dearly like, but we would not make multi-million dollar
gifts to these persons when such a gift could result in career-ending reputational damage to
ourselves or (after Obus) criminal liability. Nonetheless, any passage of such information to a
friend, after Obus, may be viewed by regulators as a “gift” that satisfies the Dirks standard.
22
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pattern or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information
knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic
information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality.”24 If that were the
case, then Rule 10b5-2 would prohibit trading on those facts,25 but most tips among
acquaintances will not involve facts satisfying this standard. In short, the bartender today
can listen carefully to his tipsy customer and trade.
Consider next one last case where the relationship is even more predatory:
assume that a cab driver waits outside the offices of a well known Manhattan law firm
late at night, hoping to pick up “M&A” lawyers who then discuss pending transactions on
their cell phones on the drive home. Assume further that the cab driver has done this
repeatedly and profited handsomely. Still, no fiduciary or other confidential relationship
is present here. Nor, at least on these facts, is the cab driver breaching any instructions
given, or expectations held, by his own employer. At most, there is a weak agency
relationship here between the cab driver and his client that might come under the outer
wings of the Restatement of Agency.26
Comparatively, the behavior in both the foregoing bartender and taxi driver
hypotheticals is more opportunistic and predatory than the case of the loose-lipped
associate who is simply overheard in an elevator. Thus, it may then seem arbitrary to
draw a line that holds liable the defendant in Obus who arguably made a gift (but for no
personal benefit) but finds no liability in the cases of more predatory defendants, who

24

See Rule 10b5-2(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b5-2(b)(2) (2013).
Id.
26
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 388 cmt. C (2012) (discussed infra at notes 57–59
and accompanying text).
25
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have stalked and stolen from their “victims,” as in the last two examples of the bartender
and taxi driver.
B. Non-deceptive “Theft” of Business Information
Dorozhko extends the law of insider trading significantly, but it recognizes that
some element of deception must still be present for a defendant to violate Rule 10b-5.
Thus, it drew a questionable line between a person who misappropriates material
information through an affirmative misrepresentation and one who steals the same
information and trades without disclosure. Specifically, it found that a computer hacker
who misrepresents his identity to gain access to the information does violate Rule 10b-5,
but it also suggested that a hacker who penetrates computer security without a
misrepresentation and then fails to disclose that he is trading based on the “possession of
nonpublic market information” does not.27 Understandable as this distinction may have
been in light of the existing case law, it is neither morally self-evident nor compelled by
the language of Rule 10b-5, as will be later discussed. Sunday school instructors will
never teach their pupils that the former hacker has done evil, but the latter hacker who
steals without a misrepresentation has not. Only doctrine-obsessed (but morally myopic)
lawyers can be satisfied with such a line.

See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that “[i]t is unclear, however,
that exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to gain unauthorized access is ‘deceptive,’ rather
than being mere theft. Accordingly, depending on how the hacker gained access, it seems to us
entirely possible that computer hacking could be, by definition, a ‘deceptive device or
contrivance’ that is prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”) (emphasis added). The court
then remanded for a determination on this issue. The above quoted language suggests that a
“mere theft” without an affirmative misrepresentation is not “deceptive” and thus not within the
scope of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. This article suggests that this analysis is too glib, as much
theft is deceptive.
27
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To be sure, artful prosecutors can potentially describe much behavior as
deceptive. Defendants can be alleged to have “stealthily snuck” into an investment
banker’s office late at night to read his files, or they can “furtively glance” over another’s
shoulder on a train to read a memorandum he is studying. It may also be deceptive for a
private party to illegally wire tap another’s phone or to focus powerful microphones on
such a person to overhear conversations. But stealing someone’s briefcase at gunpoint
still seems robbery, and not fraud. In short, Dorozhko can be pushed, but only so far.
C. “Warehousing” and Selective Disclosure.
In United States v. O’Hagan,28 the majority of the Supreme Court postponed for
another day whether “warehousing”—“the practice by which bidders leak advance
information of a tender offer to allies and encourage them to purchase the target
company’s stock before the bid is announced”29—violated the federal securities laws.
Today, such behavior would clearly violate Rule 14e-3 if a takeover bid is already being
structured and is later announced,30 and it could sometimes violate Regulation FD, which
seeks to restrict selective disclosure.31 Still, Regulation FD has numerous exceptions and
applies only to reporting companies.32 Further, O’Hagan expressly states that one may
use material nonpublic information obtained as the result of a breach of a fiduciary duty
if one first discloses to the source that one is about to breach one’s fiduciary duty by

United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 673 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
See Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2013). Technically, the rule is only applicable if a
person has already taken “a substantial step or steps to commence . . . a tender offer.” See id. §
240.14e-3(a).
31
See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2013).
32
See Rule 101(b), 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (defining “issuer” to include only reporting
companies).
28
29

14

trading on that information.33 The Court’s rationale is that an open and disclosed
fiduciary breach is not deceptive.
To be sure, there is a distinct possibility in “warehousing” cases that the corporate
officer who deliberately tips arbitrageurs is breaching his fiduciary duty to his acquiring
corporation. But this is hardly self-evident when the intention behind his tipping is to
increase the acquirer’s prospects of success. As in Obus, much may depend on whether
the acquiring corporation has policies that forbid such disclosure, and these policies can
be amended to create exceptions when a bidder wishes to engage in such conduct (and
can avoid the reach of Rule 14e-3).
In summary, gaps and loopholes exist in current law that permit the misuse of
material, nonpublic information and have no strong efficiency justification. The
aspirational “abstain or disclose” rule of Cady Roberts has not then been fully
implemented. To be sure, the overall significance of these gaps can be debated (as,
realistically, bartenders and cab drivers do not trade with the same volume or frequency
as hedge funds). Nonetheless, given these gaps, the next question becomes: Are there
legal theories that could preclude such conduct that are within the potential reach of
existing legal doctrine?
Part II. Potential Theories
Herein, we will examine potential theories that could close the foregoing gaps
without legislation, but this section does not consider the costs, wisdom, or practicality of
such an effort.

521 U.S. at 655 (“[I]f the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the
nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”).
33
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A. Fraud on the Market. One of the curious features of existing insider trading
law is that it has largely ignored the “fraud on the market” doctrine and the significance
of market efficiency. Again, this seems the product of path dependency. Dirks was
decided in 1983,34 five years before the Supreme Court in 1988 accepted the “fraud on
the market” doctrine in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.35 In Dirks, the Court redefined insider
trading liability to rest it on a “property rights” foundation under which the corporation
became the victim, injured by the insider leaking information belonging to it.36 Later, in
endorsing misappropriation theory in United States v. O’Hagan,37 the Court simply
extended this same theory to the source of the material information, at least when the
tippee “feign[ed] fidelity” to that source.38 In all likelihood, the Court was motivated to
adopt this “property rights” interpretation because the corporation seemed a clearer
victim than its investors. Particularly when the investors are not already shareholders in
the company at the time they purchase, the doctrinal problems are substantial: How are
such persons legally injured in the absence of any demonstrated detrimental reliance on
their part or any obvious duty owed to them, as non-shareholders? In contrast, when
confidential business information is released without the corporation’s authorization, the
injury to the corporation seems more obvious (and, early on, Texas Gulf Sulphur gave a
graphic illustration of this problem).39

34

463 U.S. 646.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
36
See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
37
521 U.S. 642.
38
Id. at 655.
39
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Texas Gulf Sulphur (“TGS”)
discovered extraordinary mineral and precious metal deposits in Timmins, Ontario. Id. at 843–
44. TGS then suspended drilling in part to buy the surrounding land. Id. But heavy trading in its
35

16

Still, a few years after Dirks, in Basic, the Court did focus on this issue of
individual reliance and decided that there was an injury to the individual investor when
material information is concealed or omitted.40 Misleading statements or omissions do
defraud investors, it concluded, “even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements,”41 because in essence the investor relies instead on the integrity of the
market price.42 Logically, if this theory works for purposes of a garden-variety securities
fraud action, then it should work as well in insider trading cases, which equally rest on
Rule 10b-5. Hence, Basic provides a plausible basis for viewing the trading counterparty
as a victim of insider trading. In both contexts, the investor who buys an overvalued
stock is relying on the accuracy of the market price. The defendant in both cases knows
the stock is mispriced.
Still, the problem with such a theory is that it may prove too much. Conceivably,
it might overbroadly require corporations to inform the market on a daily, or even hourly,
basis of all material developments. As Basic itself recognized, this would go too far. But
Basic also solved this problem by further holding that: “Silence, absent a duty to disclose,
is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”43 This rule protects the corporation that remains
silent, but not the insider who wishes to trade. Once the issue is framed so that there

securities by its management drove up its stock price, started rumors of a major discovery, and
may have alerted the market to the significance of TGS’s ore strike. Id. at 851. If this trading
made it more costly for TGS to acquire the surrounding land, there is an obvious corporate injury
on these facts.
40
485 U.S. 224.
41
Id. at 241–42.
42
Id. at 245 (courts may utilize a presumption that persons who trade “had done so in reliance on
the integrity of the price set by the market”).
43
Id. at 239 n.17.
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must be a requisite duty to disclose, the corporate insider is caught because, as an insider,
he or she has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.
Still, the individuals in our foregoing hypotheticals—the bartender, the cab driver,
and the person who overhears material information in the elevator—are not fiduciaries.
To find their conduct deceptive, some other undisclosed breach of a duty must be
postulated. That is, in the case of a tippee who is not part of a conspiracy with the tipper
in which some benefit is exchanged, we must find some other duty that has been
breached in order to be able to characterize this tippee’s conduct as deceptive and
therefore in violation of Rule 10b-5. Some may broadly assert that all tippees have a
duty to disclose before trading, but the doctrinal foundation for such a rule seems weak,
because such a tippee and its counterparty are legal strangers to each other who trade in
anonymous markets. For liability to be imposed on the non-fiduciary, some duty must be
postulated that obligates such a tippee to disclose or abstain. But, as next discussed,
finding such a separate and distinct duty is not an insurmountable obstacle.
B. The Duty to Hold Lost or Stolen Information in Confidence
As just discussed, it can be argued that other contemporaneous traders do rely on
the accuracy of the market price and so those trading on the opposite side are injured
when defendants trade knowing that the price is inaccurate. Indeed, Basic appears to say
exactly this, but it also recognizes that silence should not be actionable unless some
specific duty to disclose is triggered.44 In O’Hagan, the tippee “feign[ed] fidelity” to his
source to gain the information, and that was held “deceptive.”45

44
45

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
521 U.S. at 652.
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As a result, under the logic of these cases, if a tippee has neither misappropriated
the information from the source nor provided some benefit to the tipper (or received a gift
from the tipper), then Rule 10b-5 seemingly permits the non-fiduciary tippee to trade.
After all, this was exactly the status of Ray Dirks, who neither paid his tipper anything
nor “feigned fidelity” to the source of the information. Still, if the tippee both trades and
breaches some distinct duty in so doing, nothing in Dirks insulates him from liability.
That brings us to the harder part: What is the duty that the tippee might breach
when the tippee is not a fiduciary (or the tippee of a fiduciary) but has come into
possession of material nonpublic information? Here, the suggested answer is best stated
in two parts: First, when the information is stolen (but taken without deception), the law
could be viewed as imposing a constructive trust on such stolen property that holds the
thief accountable for his ill-gotten profits.46 Second, even when the information is leaked

46

As a technical matter, the appropriate remedy may be an equitable accounting, rather than a
constructive trust. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(distinguishing remedies); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.11 (1978)
(arguing that a fiduciary is accountable for profits without regard to injury to principal);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958). Nonetheless, courts often prefer to
use the phrase “constructive trust.” See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 700
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d on other grounds 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); Diamond v. Oreamuno,
248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
Semantics aside, the law has long recognized that a thief or a knowing receiver of stolen
goods is subject to an equitable accounting or constructive trust. See Lightfoot v. Davis, 91 N.E.
582 (N.Y. 1910); Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, 156 N.E. 670 (N.Y. 1927); see also,
Comment, The Thief as Constructive Trustee, 37 YALE L.J. 654 (1928). Also, the common law
has traditionally favored the original owner of stolen property even over a “good faith” purchaser
from the thief. For a modern such case, see O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980). In this
case, the artist Georgia O’Keefe was held entitled to recover a painting by her that she either lost
or had stolen from a good faith purchaser from the intermediate possessor. Id. The court noted
that if the painting had been stolen, plaintiff O’Keefe would have been entitled to recover if she
sued within the statute of limitations. Id. at 867. For an overview of these rules on good faith
purchasers of stolen property, see Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the
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inadvertently (as in the overheard conversation in the elevator), the law could treat the
recipient of the information as a “finder” who has come into possession of lost property
(and therefore has an obligation to act as a bailee to protect this property by not tipping or
trading on it).47
This latter claim about lost property requires an explanation of complex common law
principles that have frankly never been applied to the context of insider trading. At common
law (and by statute in many jurisdictions), one who finds lost property (say, a diamond ring
left by mistake in a washroom) is typically under a duty to restore it to the true owner. 48
Although this body of law on “finders” and lost property is hyper-technical,49 the finder is

essentially in the position of a bailee of the lost property, accountable to the true owner.50

Good Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987). This article, however, does not address the
“good faith purchaser” but only the tippee who is aware of an unauthorized release. Id.
47
For recent summaries of the law applicable to finders, see Anne M. Payne, Rights and
Obligations of Finders, Owners and Former Owners, 1 AM. JUR. 2D, ABANDONED, LOST, AND
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY § 27 (2013) (“The finder of lost property holds it as a bailee for the true
owner; as to all others, the finder’s rights are tantamount to ownership . . . .”). Cf. Hurley v. City
of Niagara Falls, 289 N.Y.S.2d 889 (App. Div. 1968), aff’d, 254 N.E.2d 917 (N.Y. 1969). Thus,
the thrust of this analogy is to treat the recipients of inadvertent releases of material nonpublic
information as bailees.
48
For example, see, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 252–54 (McKinney 2013) (requiring a finder
to deliver any item of personal property with a value over twenty dollars to the police within ten
days and awarding such property to the finder after the expiration of a period ranging from three
months to three years, depending on its value).
49
The law on finders in the United States has been described as “a state-by-state hodgepodge of
common law, modern statutes, and haphazard local regulations.” See Mark D. West, Losers:
Recovering Lost Property in Japan and the United States, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 369, 396–97
(2003). More than one third of the states have enacted legislation requiring a finder to deliver lost
property to public authorities for a prescribed period before the finder can claim ownership. Id. at
397. However, these statutes have generally been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Saritejdiam, Inc.
v. Excess Ins. Co., 971 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1992).
Little of this complexity and confusion in the law of lost property is relevant to this
article. Typically, the litigated dispute is between the owner of the location on which the lost
property was found and the finder. Their relative rights to the property may turn on whether the
property was “lost” or only “mislaid”—a distinction most commentators find hopelessly
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The premise here is that a person who overhears material nonpublic information
(such as in a public elevator) is functionally equivalent to a “finder” who discovers lost
property, at least when the informational recipient knows that the release of the
information has not been authorized. Once that condition is satisfied, it follows that the
tippee/finder’s duty is to hold the information as a bailee and not profit from its
conversion.
Viewed intuitively, this asserted duty is probably easiest to accept when the
information has been obtained deliberately by someone who is “stalking” the source of
the information (as in our earlier cases involving the bartender and the cabdriver). Here,
equitable considerations dictate that the law should impose a constructive trust on the
“stolen” property to prevent these more predatory actors from realizing an ill-gotten gain.
In any event, the relevant point here is that, once a duty to hold lost property for the true
owner is recognized, then that duty would functionally play the same role as a fiduciary
duty in the Dirks case: trading on this information in violation of this duty to return or
restore can be viewed as just as “deceptive” as trading in violation of a fiduciary duty in
Dirks.

indeterminate. See R. H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 313, 315, 317–21 (1983); Leanna Izuel, Property Owners’ Constructive Possession of
Treasure Trove: Rethinking The Finders Keepers Rule, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1991); David
Riesman, Jr., Possession and the Law of Finders, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1121 (1939). None of
this complexity need concern us over the range of cases here considered.
50
The principle that the original owner has superior title to the finder (who in turn has superior
title to all others) dates back nearly three hundred years to Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng.
Rep. 664 (K.B.). In that case, a chimney sweep found a jewel, amidst the ashes, while cleaning a
chimney. Id. The decision held that he was entitled to keep the jewel against all others, except
“the rightful owner.” Id.
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To illustrate this, let us return to the case of the person who escapes liability under
Dorozhko because he is simply a thief who has stolen property (for example, a briefcase
containing material, nonpublic information). If this thief were to sell this briefcase and
its contents, the common law would likely subject his ill-gotten gains to a constructive or
implied trust.51 Even the good faith purchaser of the property would often have to restore
it to the true owner. By analogy, such a trust might also be imposed on the proceeds from
the misuse of stolen information.
To be sure, this analogy extends legal principles applicable to tangible personal
property to intellectual property, and that is a doctrinal leap. Still, the Supreme Court has
not hesitated to say that a corporation is entitled to “exclusive possession” of its
confidential business information.52 The net effect of this doctrinal extension is that a
tippee who has not participated in any breach of fiduciary duty, but who has either
“stolen” information or simply knowingly received “lost” information, may not trade on
it (at least without disclosure to the source). Any undisclosed breach would be deceptive
and thus within the scope of Rule 10b-5.

The law of equity makes some technical distinction between the “conscious wrongdoer” and
the “innocent wrongdoer,” and the person who trades on information that was not stolen, but
whose release was not authorized, may fall into the latter category and be subject therefore to a
“resulting trust,” not a “constructive trust.” See Henry Monaghan, Constructive Trust And
Equitable Lien: Status of The Conscious And Innocent Wrongdoer in Equity, 38 U. DET. L.J. 10
(1960).
52
See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1, at 260 (rev.
ed. 1986) to the effect that “Confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the
course and conduct of its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the
exclusive right and benefit, and which a court of equity will protect through the injunctive process
or other appropriate remedy”).
51
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Concededly, few courts, if any, would be willing to go this far on their own. But
they might be induced to accept and enforce SEC rules articulating such a duty. Such a
rule would specify the duty of a tippee who becomes aware of material nonpublic
information that such tippee knows was not intended to be (and has not otherwise been)
publicly released. A line would necessarily need to be drawn in such a rule between
information that was truly “lost” and information that was “abandoned” through reckless
mishandling. In my view, the earlier bartender and cab driver hypotheticals would fall on
the unlawful side of this line, and such recipients should be barred from trading on such
information.
More difficult, to be sure, is the case of merely “lost” information, such as the
information overheard in the elevator where the recipient is not stalking the victim. But
at common law, even in this case, the superior property right in “lost” property still
remains with the owner (i.e., the corporate issuer), unless it “abandoned” the property.
How could such a legal rule be feasibly implemented? Imagine an SEC Rule (let
us call it proposed Rule 10b5-3), which might be captioned “Duty Not to Trade on In
advertent or Unauthorized Releases of Material Information.” It might read:

Proposed Rule 10b5-3
(a) Whenever a person receives or obtains material
nonpublic information from a source that owns or has the
right to control the release of such information and such
recipient either (a) knows that the release of such
information has not been lawfully authorized by the party
entitled to possession or control over such information, or
(b) is aware of a reasonable possibility that such release
was not lawfully authorized, such person may not (i)
purchase or sell any security, or any security-based swap
agreement, whose value is likely to be affected by such
information, or (ii) communicate such information to other
23

persons under circumstances which make it reasonably
foreseeable that they will trade on such information, until in
each case such information has been publicly released.
(b) As used in this rule, a release of information is
not ‘lawfully authorized,’ if, the release is, without
limitation, (i) inadvertent or by mistake; (ii) the result of a
trick, subterfuge, false representation, or other
misappropriation; (iii) intended as a gift, favor or other
benefit, either from or to the information recipient; or (iv)
for a specific, limited purpose to a customer, supplier,
lender, business associate, or agent of any thereof, but was
not intended to be generally disseminated.

The foregoing rule is drafted so that it would apply to material information that has been
released either as the result of a misappropriation or a mistake; the information could
concern either the actual corporate issuer having possession of the information or a third
party (such as the target company that the corporate issuer intended to acquire at a
premium). The proposed rule would thus bar the “finder” of such information from
either trading or tipping others, but only until the information was publicly released.
Still, the rule would not bar the recipient from communicating the information to
regulators or the press (as in Dirks). Also, it would not apply to the person who discovers
information through his own research or efforts (where there was neither a
misappropriation nor a mistaken release).53 Finally, the proposed rule should not apply to
the person who simply hears a rumor (because such person does not “know,” or have
reason to believe, that the information’s release has not been “lawfully authorized”).

53

Hence, if I wish to observe the size of the crowds at various outlets of a chain or department
store to estimate its holiday sales, I may trade on this information. The proposed rule would also
not apply if the information is not acquired from a source that has possession or control rights
over it. Thus, if I observe a major airline plane crash, even though this information is both
material and still nonpublic, I could trade on such information, without violating this proposed
rule.

24

Negligence is insufficient for liability; rather, some awareness is required to establish
scienter.
The feasibility of this proposed rule must be considered in light of recent
technological innovations, most notably the advent of social media. Would this rule
mean that information released in a “tweet” or on Facebook would bar those receiving it
from trading? The answer is no, because the term “publicly released” would be broadly
interpreted to include the release of information on social media and widely followed
websites. Any contrary rule would sweep overbroadly.
Would such a rule be upheld by the courts? Would it sweep too broadly, creating
undesirable uncertainty and criminalizing mere negligence? Would its costs outweigh its
benefits? These questions will be deferred temporarily.
C. Codifying Dorozhko
Although the Second Circuit said in Dorozhko that deception is sufficient without
a breach of fiduciary duty, the SEC has not yet spoken to this issue, and the Dorozhko
decision defined deception narrowly to require a false representation.54 In principle, if
the SEC were to endorse Dorozhko, or some variant of it, the SEC’s position should merit
Chevron deference.55 Moreover, given its expertise, the SEC would be the appropriate
body to attempt to define what “deception” might mean in this special context of trading
markets. Thus, consider the following proposed rule that the SEC could adopt (let us call
this proposed Rule 10b5-4):

54

See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that
an agency’s interpretation of its statute is entitled to deference when not inconsistent with clear
Congressional intent).
55
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Proposed Rule 10b5-4
For the purposes of Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1933 and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and
the antifraud rules thereunder, the terms ‘deceptive,’
‘deceit’ and ‘artifice to defraud’ shall be deemed, without
limitation, to include the following conduct when done in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security or a
security-based swap agreement:
(1) misrepresenting one’s identity or purpose in
obtaining, or attempting to obtain, access to information
that the actor is aware is likely to be material and
nonpublic;
(2) taking, emailing, reproducing, photocopying, or
otherwise misappropriating business records or other
confidential information, or disseminating such records or
information to persons not authorized to receive such
information, through either an affirmative
misrepresentation or by means of a covert act or subterfuge,
when one knows, or is recklessly indifferent to the
prospect, that such records or information are likely to
contain material, nonpublic information that the lawful
owner of the information has not authorized for
contemporaneous public release;
[(3) failing to disclose one’s identity, employment,
status, conflict of interest, or other relevant information
when one knows that such disclosure would likely cause
another person not to reveal, or to cease to reveal,
information that is material and nonpublic.]
This language deliberately expands Dorozhko to the limits of its logic, but it does
not reach simple negligence. It would cover theft through deception (but not armed
robbery), to the extent that the actor knows (or is recklessly aware) that he or she is likely
misappropriating material nonpublic information. In its view, the individual who opens
another’s briefcase or desk drawer to discover confidential information has engaged in a
“covert act or subterfuge” that is sufficient to satisfy Rule 10b-5’s deception requirement.
The third and final bracketed clause reaches the furthest (and may be more vulnerable) in
requiring the disclosure of one’s identity or conflict when one is hearing an extended
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conversation, but it would not cover overhearing the ten-second remark in an elevator. It
is included mainly for discussion purposes.
In all cases, this proposed rule would be violated only if the defendant trades or
causes others to do so on an approximately contemporaneous basis;56 no violation results
from simply misappropriating information unless there is a trade “in connection with
such” misappropriation. In overview, this route is probably the simplest, most direct path
to the end of reaching cases that do not involve a breach of fiduciary duty, but it depends
on Dorozhko remaining good law.
In response to this proposal, some may question whether the SEC can effectively
rewrite Dorozhko and eliminate its seeming requirement of a false representation. One
answer, of course, is that this is exactly what the SEC did in adopting Rule 10b5-2, which
overrode the Second Circuit’s earlier en banc holding in United States v. Chestman57 that
husbands and wives were not fiduciaries to each other.58 Today, Rule 10b5-2 expressly
provides that they owe each other a duty of trust or confidence.59 Chevron deference
enabled the SEC to make new law in defining the scope of fiduciary relationships, and it
even more clearly entitles the SEC to define the meaning of “deception” and
“deceptive.”60

The standards with respect to the “in connection with” requirement are set forth in SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002), which held a broker to have violated Rule 10b-5 when the broker
stole funds from his client’s discretionary trading account. Although the issue in that case was
the “in connection with” requirement, the Court had no difficulty in finding theft to violate Rule
10b-5.
57
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
58
Id. at 568–71.
59
See Rule 10b5-2(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3) (2013).
60
Because “deceptive device” is expressly used in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
it seems even more within the logical scope of the SEC’s Chevron authority than does the issue of
56
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Equally important, the Dorozhko court appears to construe the term deception
overly narrowly. Looking to the definitions of “deception” and “deceive” in Webster’s
International Dictionary’s 1934 edition (the year of passage for the Securities Exchange
Act), the panel emphasized that Webster’s defined “deceive” to mean “to cause to believe
the false, or to disbelieve the true.”61 But, as the panel noted but did not discuss, this
same edition of Webster’s also defined the term to mean “to impose upon; to deal
treacherously with; cheat.”62 Reading another’s mail, opening their desk drawers, or
hacking their computer (by any means) is cheating and amounts to “treacherous”
behavior. Or, at least, the SEC could safely so rule.
D. The Restatement of Agency
Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency has long stated a broad
theory of an agent’s duty to protect and keep confidential information that it learns from
its principal. Specifically, Comment c to that Section states:
c. Use of confidential information. An agent who acquires
confidential information in the course of his employment or
in violation of his duties has a duty . . . to account for any
profits made by the use of such information, although this
does not harm the principal.63

which relatives constitute fiduciaries (the issue addressed by Rule 10b5-2). Nor does state law
tend to vary on this question of what is “deceptive.” Finally, Dorozhko does not expressly hold
that conduct not involving a false representation is always insufficient to satisfy the “deceptive
device” standard, but only suggests that such a line is likely on its facts. See 574 F.3d 42.
61
574 F.3d at 50. (citing WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) at 679). The
Supreme Court has also looked to the 1934 edition of Webster’s to understand the meaning of
words in the 1934 Act. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.20 (1976).
62
Id. at 50.
63
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958) (citation omitted). Section 395
then forbids the agent to tip others. See id. § 395.
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The commentary to this section specifically applies this rule to the context of insider
trading, and the New York Court of Appeals relied on this language in Diamond v.
Oreamuno over forty years ago.64
Under Section 388, no fiduciary breach or act of deception is necessary. It is
sufficient that the agent acquire the “confidential information in the course of his . . .
duties.”65 Thus, in terms of our earlier hypotheticals, if a cab driver is considered an
agent to his passenger, then under Section 388, he may not profit, as agent, from
confidential information received from the passenger, as his principal.
Of course, in any realistic case, issues could arise both as to whether the cab
driver was an agent (as opposed to an independent contractor66) or whether he knew the
information was confidential. Still, Section 388 reaches well beyond the narrower
definition of fiduciary and covers all agents. Thus, in cases involving “stalking” of the
64

248 N.E. 2d 910 (N.Y. 1969). The Court added that profits made by the agent in stock
transactions based on such inside information “are held in constructive trust for the principal.”
Id. at 914 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,
700 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (imposing constructive trust on stock trading profits based on inside
information), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). Not all courts have followed
Diamond. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1978). But those that have not
have chiefly relied on the fact that federal insider trading law already supplies an adequate
remedy. That is not an answer when federal law stops short. Finally, this article does not
propose that state courts take any step, but only that, in determining the scope of the federal
remedy, courts should consider the classic law of agency.
65
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 388 cmt. c (1958).
66
The definition of agent is set forth in Section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, and
covers any relationship that “results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the other so to act.”
This broad language might reach the cab driver, but probably not the bartender in our earlier
hypotheticals. To the extent that the passenger can instruct the cab driver what route to take, the
cab driver is arguably “subject to his control” and thus resembles an agent. The bartender (like
the soda jerk) is simply selling a product (alcoholic beverages), although when James Bond asks
for his Beefeater’s martini to be shaken and not stirred, (and the bartender agrees), this may take
the bartender a small step closer to being an agent.
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victim (as in our earlier taxi driver hypothetical), prosecutors have at their disposal both a
potential “deception” theory under Dorozhko and an agency theory under Section 388.
E. Willful Violations of Regulation FD
Regulation FD prohibits “reporting companies” from making selective disclosure,
subject to certain exceptions.67 Thus, by itself, it would probably preclude the practice of
“warehousing” if the tipper was a senior executive of a reporting company.
But the penalties for such a violation are likely to be far more modest than those
for insider trading, and Regulation FD expressly provides that a failure to comply with it
does not violate Rule 10b-5.68 Still, one potential theory has not yet been pursued: a
“willful” violation of any SEC rule is a criminal offense under both the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.69 Thus, a corporate officer of a
“reporting company” who “willfully” tips arbitrageurs about an impending transaction in
violation of Regulation FD is seemingly subject to criminal prosecution. Although the
JOBS Act exempts many issuers from becoming reporting companies, this is a theory of
liability that could already apply to most listed companies, but it has not yet been utilized
by prosecutors.
Part III. An Evaluation
To this point, it has been argued that some common law doctrines have sufficient
plasticity that they can be manipulated to reach desired results: Specifically, they could
67

See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 et seq. (2013).
See Rule 102, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2013). This also likely means that there is no private cause
of action for a violation of Regulation FD.
69
See Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (West 2012), and Section 32 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A § 78ff (West 2012). For a recent analysis of the
requirement of “willfulness” under these provisions, see United States v. Whitman, No. 12-CR125, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163138 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012).
68

30

enable the SEC to describe many forms of misbehavior as “deceptive,” even though they
involve neither a false representation nor a fiduciary breach. But, the issue remains:
How desirable is it to push the law to the outer boundaries of “deception”? The
following considerations bear on this question:
1. Overcriminalization. Do we really want to reach the person who is
provided a valuable tip unintentionally? Opinions will vary. Some will argue that the
temptation to trade on such information will often be irresistible and that the persons who
violate the proposed rule will not have knowledge of the applicable law, thus trapping
unwary (even if somewhat culpable) ordinary laymen. But the primary rule here
proposed (Rule 10b5-4) does not make equivocal conduct actionable. Under it, the tippee
must stalk the victim, using either a covert means or subterfuge to obtain the information
or misrepresenting the tippee’s identity or purpose. This is not morally neutral conduct,
and those who engage in it are entitled to little empathy.
In contrast, proposed Rule 10b5-3, which applies to those who come into
possession of “lost” information, does sweep more broadly and can be asserted to
potentially criminalize fairly equivocal conduct. Even this rule, however, would be
limited by a broad interpretation of the concept of “public release,” so that information on
social media or widely followed websites would be considered to be in the public domain
and freely usable.
2. The Impact on Market Efficiency. Arguably, Dirks may be at least partially
explained by the Court’s fear that the SEC’s proposed theory of liability would chill
securities analysts and thereby prevent the detection of some frauds. Certainly, it is
implausible that Ray Dirks would have travelled from the East Coast to Los Angeles to
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investigate Equity Funding at first hand if he had not seen the prospect of profit (for
himself and his clients).
Indeed, the Dirks case dramatically underscores the social value in the early
detection of fraud. Not only was the overvaluation in the market price of Equity Funding
corrected (which admittedly helps some investors (i.e., purchasers) and hurts other (i.e.,
sellers)), but non-shareholders also benefitted: the prospective purchasers of Equity
Funding’s insurance were protected from investing their retirement savings in a worthless
product. If analysts are chilled, the social injury might be considerable and extend
beyond investors to a variety of third parties.
Thus, most securities law scholars and practitioners have resisted a parity-ofinformation approach to defining the scope of the insider trading prohibition because it
would dull market efficiency by chilling the incentive to search for new information.
Proposed Rule 10b5-3 does not go anywhere near adopting a parity of information
approach. Research could still fuel trading, even when it developed material new
information. But the tippee who learns new nonpublic, material information that is
owned or controlled by another would no longer be protected, even though he owes no
duty to that source.70 Under proposed Rule 10b5-3, he would be made a “finder” who
could not trade on such information. As a result, proposed Rule 10b5-3 would largely
swallow up most of the terrain now covered by Regulation FD, but it would extend even
further. Some uncertainty would likely surround the loose edges of this rule, including in
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SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 2012), may have already gone substantially this far by
seemingly eliminating the need to show that the tippee paid an economic benefit to the tipper, but
it remains still unclear what the Court actually meant in Obus. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
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cases where analysts have arguably pieced together a “mosaic” of information from
multiple sources. To say the least, such a rule would be resisted by analysts and others
within the financial services industry.
Still, these concerns about uncertainty and the soft edges of the rule apply much
more to proposed Rule 10b5-3 than to proposed Rule 10b5-4. The latter rule requires
some “covert act” of deception or an affirmative misrepresentation. It aims at prohibiting
stealth, theft and misappropriation, not simply mistaken or unauthorized release.
Valuable as analysts may be, they are not entitled to steal information. Dorozhko’s
unwillingness to cover “mere theft” of information seems anomalous and unjustified (at
least on public policy grounds), and proposed Rule 10b5-4 responds to its shortfall. But
Rule 10b5-4 (unlike Rule 10b5-3) does not restrict the analyst who simply stumbles
across new information. Thus, it leaves largely in place the protective shield that Dirks
erected around analysts. In contrast, Rule 10b5-3 would largely remove that shield.
Thus, the case for proposed Rule 10b5-4 is again much simpler than that for proposed
Rule 10b5-3.
3. Federalism. Although several decisions have found that the duty to
disclose should be determined by federal (and not state) law, federalizing a duty not to
trade on “lost” information pushes the SEC’s power to make new law to its limit. No
term actually in the 1934 Act would be construed by proposed Rule 10b5-3, and thus the
claim that the SEC is entitled to Chevron deference is weakened. Moreover, the actual
law on “finders” and lost property varies widely among the states and was never truly
applied to information (as opposed to personal property). Finally, although the theory
outlined in proposed Rule 10b5-3 applies only when the person trading on the “lost”
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information trades in an efficient market (and thus deprives other investors of their right
to rely on the accuracy of the market price), it is far from clear that courts would regard
such behavior as adequately “deceptive” to fall within Rule 10b-5’s prohibition.
For all these reasons, the far simpler approach would be for the SEC to define
“deceptive” to include stealing information or acquiring it by trick or ruse (as proposed
Rule 10b5-4 would do). Such a rule has a better chance of receiving Chevron deference,
and its premise that theft of information is generally deceptive eliminates the strange
distinction that Dorozhko has seemingly erected between fraud and theft. Historically,
the draftsmen of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 explained the intent of Section
10(b) to Congress, saying that it was meant to be a “catch all” provision that essentially
declared:
“Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.”71
More recently, the Court has said in a case also involving simple theft that Section 10(b)
“should be ‘construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to achieve its
remedial purposes.’”72 Stealing information by any trick, ruse, invasion of privacy, or
simple theft—however novel the means—is at bottom just another “cunning device,”
which should be within the scope of Rule 10b-5, at least if the SEC would so indicate.

71

This is the famous statement of Thomas G. Corcoran to the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. Mr. Corcoran (also known as “Tommy the Cork”) was one of the principal
draftsmen of the Securities Exchange Act and a protégé of Justice Felix Frankfurter (who also
influenced the legislation). See Stock Exchange Regulation Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R.
8720 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
72
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002). The Court also emphasized that “any distinction
between omissions and misrepresentation is illusory in the context” of a theft by a broker owing a
fiduciary duty. Id. at 823. This rejection of technical distinction may continue in other cases
involving similarly egregious misbehavior.
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This suggested intermediate position would leave unchanged the status of the
tippee who simply overhears information innocently,73 but that “gap” does not—today at
least—threaten the integrity of the market. This does not mean that the SEC could not at
some future point also seek to restrict the use of “lost” information. But change best
comes incrementally. The first step should be to generalize the outcome in Dorozhko, but
without its strange requirement of a false representation.
Is it realistic to think the SEC might take such a step? That is harder to predict.
The SEC is undoubtedly overworked and underfunded and has much on its plate.
Moreover, the agency appears anxious that rules proposed by it might be rejected by the
D.C. Circuit on cost/benefit or related grounds.74 But rules relating to insider trading are
less likely to be challenged by industry groups, and the Commission is in a safer position
when it promulgates anti-fraud rules against insider trading than when it seeks to regulate
corporate governance. Although the SEC moves slowly, it should move ultimately in the
general direction here outlined.
CONCLUSION
Above all, this article has argued that the process of defining insider trading has
not been completed. Gaps remain, and new ones will likely arise again in the future. The

It can be argued that such tippees are already exposed to liability under the Second Circuit’s
standard for tippee liability in SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 298 (2d Cir. 2012). See supra notes 8–
11 and accompanying text. To the extent that Obus is read literally, a case may exist for a safe
harbor rule protecting analysts and others where no benefit or payment is exchanged by them for
information. In essence, this would only restore the Dirk standard from erosion.
74
In Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the D.C. Court of
Appeals invalidated the SEC’s newly adopted Rule 14a-11 for failure to adequately consider the
potential costs and benefits of the rule.
73

35

SEC can fill these gaps, and doctrinal means are available by which the SEC could
extend the reach of Rule 10b-5.
Closer questions surround the various tools that the SEC could use. For the short
run, the simplest course would be for the SEC to define by rule that deception by trick,
ruse, or subterfuge violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, even if no affirmative
misrepresentation is made. This is justifiable both in terms of Section 10(b)’s original
purpose of serving as the flexible “catchall” remedy to bar all other “cunning devices”75
and Webster’s 1934 definition of “deceive” to include “cheating” and dealing
“treacherously” with another.76 For the longer run, the ability of the non-fiduciary to
trade on material, nonpublic information that has been inadvertently released or
selectively distributed raises more difficult problems, but ones that also merit closer
scrutiny and constraint.
This process may never end. Predictably, new “cunning devices” will surface
from time to time, as fraud evolves and mutates. Voluminous as the writing has been
about insider trading, this point has been largely missed: Rule 10b-5 was intended to
evolve to keep pace with the ingenuity of fraudsters. It still can—if the SEC will only
exercise its authority.

75
76

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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